INTRODUCTION
For almost half a century, the Inter-American human rights system has played an important role in the consolidation of democratic norms in the Western Hemisphere. Yet its workings are largely unknown to human rights advocates and legal scholars in the United States. As economic globalization and transnational adjudication continue to rise in importance, it becomes more and more important that U.S. legal scholars, students, and practitioners understand the workings of these influential regional institutions.
This Article advances that understanding in two parts. The first part of the Article develops the first detailed and systematic description of the Inter-American human rights system to be published in English. This introduction to the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights proceeds in six parts, examining the twin institutions' history, composition, functions, exercise of jurisdiction, trends in jurisprudence to date, and the methods and effectiveness of enforcement of the institutions' rulings. The second part of the Article builds upon the introduction to evaluate the historical effectiveness of the Inter-American human rights system. It also explores how the system might confront several key challenges facing it today. The first challenge is how to improve human rights compliance in Cuba, the region's most problematic State. The second is to address the increasing disconnection between the InterAmerican human rights system and the English-speaking States of the Western Hemisphere.
The Article concludes that although the regional system is unlikely to regain popularity with the English-speaking States, it could have an important role to play in advancing human rights in Cuba, if U.S. policymakers will let it.
I. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) and its sister institution, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the Commission, or IACHR) are charged with protecting human rights in the Western Hemisphere.
The Commission was established in 1959 and began to operate in 1960. 1 In 1969, the Organization of American States (-OAS‖) adopted the [VOL. 9:639 Although there were relatively few democracies in the Western Hemisphere during the first half of the twentieth century, intellectual leaders in the American region shared a common heritage of philosophical agreement on human rights, stemming from the Enlightenment. 8 Statements of human rights were commonplace in national constitutions throughout the region as American colonies achieved their independence from European powers in the nineteenth century. 9 There was thus broad regional support for the adoption of an American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man during the same 1948 conference that created the Charter of the Organization of American States. 10 The American Declaration was the first international human rights document, preceding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by a few months.
11
The American Declaration stopped short of translating its expression of shared human rights norms and aspirations into binding legal obligations. 12 Although several States advocated binding commitments at that time, the United States and other regional powers opposed the move. 13 The idea for a regional Court to enforce these rights was, however, already conceived. The founding conference of the OAS adopted a resolution recommending the creation of an Inter-American Court to Protect the Rights of Man, pending further study. recognition of human rights. 15 The Ninth Conference of American States, which adopted both the Inter-American Charter and the American Declaration, occurred during the final days of the fourth Roosevelt Administration. Later U.S. foreign policy, however, emphasized the fight to resist and contain Communism, with mixed results for U.S. regional leadership on human rights. 16 U.S. leadership on human rights was also hampered during the 1950s and 1960s by Southern senators who recognized the development of such international institutions as a threat to the maintenance of racial segregation. 17 The move to establish regional enforcement institutions did not regain momentum until 1959, when situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic prompted renewed regional concern for human rights. 18 Ultimately, the OAS approved a compromise measure, establishing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a limited mandate. 19 The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969 at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica. 20 The Declaration's statements of human rights have, at best, the status of regional customary law. The Convention, in contrast, was designed to impose specific and legally binding obligations on ratifying States. 21 The Convention also established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to adjudicate the obligations set forth. 22 The Convention did not garner the eleven state ratifications needed to enter into force, however, until July 18, 1978. 23 For the first two decades, 15 . See Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 134-35 (discussing the role of the Roosevelt Administration in building human rights institutions in the American region and at the United Nations).
16. See Forsythe, supra note 9, at 79-80. 17. See, e.g., CYNTHIA SOOHOO ET AL., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 76 (2008) (noting resistance of Southern Senators to signing of the Genocide Convention, resulting in presidential promise not to forward any more human rights treaties for ratification); Natalie Hevener Kaufman, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 10, 37 (1990) (explaining that the major Senate arguments against all human rights treaties were presaged in opposition to the Genocide Convention, including concerns for the domestic civil rights situation of African Americans).
18. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 82. 
B. Composition
Both the Court and the Commission are composed of seven members. Judges on the Court serve six-year terms and may be reelected once.
31
Members of the Commission serve four-year terms and may also be reelected once. Candidates are proposed by Member States of the OAS, and voted upon by the General Assembly-including those States which have not recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. 33 Judges and Commission Members serve in their personal capacity, and may be nominated by any Member State, not just their country of citizenship.
34
The American Convention on Human Rights specifies that members of the Court should be -jurists of the highest moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights.‖ 35 The Court's founding members were highly qualified and possessed impeccable human rights credentials-four had been political prisoners. 36 Later appointments, however, have not always maintained these high standards. Nominations have occasionally been marred by politics, cronyism, and perhaps intentional attempts to undermine the effectiveness of the Court. 37 Procedures which have helped to professionalize and insulate the European human rights court from sabotage appointees have yet to be adopted within the OAS.
38
Article 55 of the Convention provides that a country called to appear before the Court may appoint a national to be involved in the hearing of that case only, if there is not already one member of the bench from that country. 39 This provision was meant to ensure that at least one member of the deliberating panel understands the domestic legal system, which is often relevant for the exhaustion of remedies analysis.
Unfortunately, the procedure was frequently abused. Peru and Guatemala in particular have had a practice of appointing ad hoc judges who dissent from an otherwise unanimous bench to recommend a holding 31 [VOL. 9:639 more favorable to their State. 40 The Court closed the door to such abuse in 2009, issuing an advisory opinion interpreting Article 55 to apply only in cases brought by one State against another. 41 The Court subsequently revised its rules of procedure to prohibit even regular judges from sitting in any case brought by alleged human rights victims against their own State. 42 Currently, members of the Commission and the Court serve part-time, usually alongside academic appointments in their home countries. 43 The Commission typically observes two regular sessions per year, of two weeks each, with additional special sessions as necessary. 44 The Court convenes for one to three weeks at a time, generally four times per year.
45
The Court and the Commission are each supported by a full-time Secretariat. 46 The Commission is supported by approximately fifty-seven full-time staff members. 47 The Court appoints a Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and professional staff, 48 and hosts approximately twenty-five interns at any given time. 49 According to the rules of the Convention, the Court is entitled to draft its own budget, which must be funded in full by the OAS. 50 In 2005, the Court's budget was nearly 1.4 million USD.
51
The Commission does not enjoy this privilege and has complained of serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate due to resource limitations. 52 In addition to OAS funds, the Commission relies on direct contributions from a number of States, as well as support from charitable organizations and the European Commission.
53

C. Functions
Functionally, the Court and the Commission play quite distinct roles in promoting human rights in the Americas. The Court operates as a forum of last resort for complaints of human rights abuses that are not adequately addressed by domestic remedies. The Commission assists the Court in identifying and handling these cases, and also develops separate activities of human rights monitoring and promotion in order to prevent future abuses.
Under the American Convention, the Commission is broadly charged with the responsibility -to promote respect for and defense of human rights.‖ 54 The Commission fulfills this mandate through a variety of activities. First, the Commission monitors the situation of human rights in all countries of the hemisphere, publishing reports on subjects and countries of special concern. 55 The Commission may also establish special [VOL. 9:639 rapporteurships to bring attention to topics and themes of concern in the Americas 56 and propose amendments and additional protocols to the Convention, to be voted upon by the General Assembly of the OAS. 57 Second, the Commission receives and processes complaints of specific human rights abuses. If the claim is admissible and has merit, 58 the Commission will seek to negotiate a friendly settlement between the offending State and the injured party, 59 or make a finding of fault and recommendations as to how the State should resolve the matter. 60 In one recent year, the Commission received over 1376 individual petitions, declaring forty-nine to be admissible, reaching four friendly settlements, and producing seven reports on the merits. The Court has two additional tools available to protect and promote human rights in the hemisphere. First, it has the power to order -provisional measures‖-also referred to as -precautionary measures‖-to prevent irreparable harm -in cases of extreme gravity and urgency.‖ 68 Procedurally, this is similar to the use of a preliminary injunction in U.S. courts. These may be issued, at the request of the Commission, even where no case is before the Court. 69 In practice, provisional measures are most frequently used to order State Parties to delay an imminent execution or provide protection to other persons who have been threatened with other bodily harm. 70 In its first three decades, the Court issued eighty-one such orders. 71 Second, the Court may issue advisory opinions interpreting the human rights obligations of States under the American Convention or other treaties protecting human rights in the hemisphere, upon the request of a State Party or any OAS organ including the Commission. 72 States may also request the Court to issue an advisory opinion regarding the compatibility of their laws with applicable human rights instruments. 73 In its first three decades (1979-2009), the Court issued twenty advisory opinions. 74 The majority of these were requested by Member States; a smaller portion by the Commission. 75 Of these opinions, thirteen provided interpretation of the American Convention, while four provided interpretations of other regional human rights treaties. 76 In addition, four advisory opinions examined the compatibility of national legislation with regional human rights obligations.
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D. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Commission and Court is bounded both geographically and by subject matter. Both institutions have supreme competence to interpret and apply the human rights treaties of the OAS. In resolving petitions and cases, the Inter-American human rights bodies may also consider other international human rights treaties ratified by a particular State, which may impose additional obligations or aid in the interpretation of regional treaties.
78
The Commission may investigate and report on the human rights situation in any country in the hemisphere. 79 The Commission may receive individual petitions alleging a violation of the American Convention or other OAS convention or protocol 80 by any State Party to the Convention. 81 It may also receive petitions alleging a violation of the American Declaration by States which have not ratified the Convention.
82
The Court's contentious jurisdiction may be exercised only over States which recognize the Court's jurisdiction. 83 In order to do so, a State must both ratify the Convention and issue a separate statement acceding to the jurisdiction of the Court. 84 A State that has declined to grant full jurisdiction may permit the Court to consider a particular case by recognizing its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. 85 92. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 46(1)(a) (exhaustion of domestic remedies required for admissibility of a case to the Commission), 61(2) (compliance with procedures of Commission required for referral of a case to the Court).
[VOL. 9:639 involved or by the Commission, after the latter has duly followed its procedures for seeking a resolution to the case outside of the Court. 93 The Court's advisory jurisprudence is also limited by principles of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. A request for an advisory opinion may be initiated only by an OAS Member State or by an OAS organ within its field of competence. 94 Thus, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights may request an advisory opinion on any matter relating to the American Convention.
E. Procedure
All individual petitions originate in the Commission, and are subject to the requirement of domestic exhaustion. 95 Once a petition has made its way through the Commission, if no settlement has been reached, it may be forwarded to the Court for adjudication. 96 An individual petition may be initiated with the Commission by any person, groups of persons, or non-governmental organization. 97 Petitions may allege a violation of the petitioner's own rights or those of another person. 98 The Executive Secretariat of the Commission first performs an initial review to ensure that the petition is complete and properly submitted. 99 It then forwards the relevant portions of the petition to the State involved for comment on the petition's admissibility. 100 The identity of the individual or organization lodging the petition will be withheld from the State unless the petitioner expressly authorizes its disclosure. 101 In general, the State has two months to file its observations on admissibility, although extended or expedited schedules are possible depending on the merits of the case. Once the Commission receives the State's observations, or if the State fails to reply within the allotted time, the Commission will proceed to make a determination of admissibility. 103 The Working Group on Admissibility studies each petition to make an initial recommendation on admissibility. 104 The Commission Members make the final decision. 105 To be admissible, three conditions must hold. First, the petition must allege facts which establish a violation of the recognized human rights. 106 Second, the petitioner must have reasonably exhausted remedies available in the domestic legal system, 107 and must have lodged the petition within six months of notification of the final domestic decision. 108 Third, the petition must not duplicate proceedings in another international body.
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When the Commission deems a petition admissible, a case is opened and proceedings on the merits are initiated. 110 Petitioners must file observations on the merits within three months, after which the State has three months to prepare its reply.
111 If a State refuses to cooperate with the Commission and files no reply, the facts alleged in the petition may be presumed true. 112 The Commission may also request that the parties appear at a hearing or that an on-site investigation be permitted to establish facts in dispute. 113 If both parties are willing, the Commission will attempt to negotiate a friendly settlement of the claim. 114 Any agreement reached must receive the consent of the victims or their next of kin, where this person is not the petitioner. 115 If no friendly settlement can be reached, the Commission will deliberate on the merits of the case, examining the arguments and evidence presented by both sides, as well as evidence obtained from any on-site investigation. [VOL. 9:639
When the Commission concludes that a violation of human rights has taken place, it prepares a preliminary report including its recommendations for how the State should redress the violation, and transmits it to the State. 117 The preliminary report also includes a deadline by which the State is expected to report what measures it has adopted to comply with the recommendations.
118 If any part of the Commission's report on the merits does not represent the unanimous conclusion of the members, they may file a separate opinion. 119 At any point from the lodging of the petition, if the Commission feels it is necessary, it may request the State to take precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm. 120 At the Commission's recommendation, the Court may order temporary protective measures on the basis of the facts as alleged; it is not necessary that these be proved beforehand.
121
Although the Commission may issue a final report with a finding of responsibility and recommendations, such a report is not legally binding.
122 If a State chooses not to comply with the recommendations, the Commission may refer the case to the Court, which does have the power to issue legally binding findings and awards. 123 Technically, this decision to bring the case to the Court rests solely with the Commission, not the individual petitioner. 124 The Procedures of the Commission instruct, however, that the desires of the petitioner should be given weight in the decision to refer a case to the Court. 125 A State may also choose to refer the case to the Court, if it wishes to challenge the Commission's finding of responsibility. 126 Cases retain the name of Petitioner v. State by which they were known during proceedings in the Commission.
Recent procedural reforms have significantly altered the role of the Commission in Court proceedings. Formerly, the Commission functioned as the party opposing the State, and bore primary responsibility for prosecuting the case. The alleged victims were permitted to intervene throughout the proceedings by submitting briefs, evidence, and motions through their counsel. 127 This model was more similar to a criminal proceeding prosecuted by a district attorney, as opposed to a civil proceeding where the victim brings claims through private counsel.
The 2009 reforms, however, give the alleged victims greater control of the legal proceedings, while relegating the Commission to a supporting role.
128 Concretely, the Commission no longer files briefs or leads questioning of witnesses; these responsibilities are assumed by the alleged victims, through their counsel. 129 The new model is thus more similar to domestic constitutional rights litigation in the United States. A key difference is that the Court will appoint, at its own expense, legal representation for alleged victims who cannot afford to retain private counsel. 130 The Court has justified the reforms as providing greater agency to victims and preserving the neutrality of the Commission. 131 Pragmatically, the shift also reduces the workload of the under-resourced Commission.
132
Written proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are somewhat more streamlined than in civil litigation in the United States. The Commission initiates proceedings by filing its own final report. 133 The alleged victims or their representatives have two months to file the brief.
134
The responding State has an additional two months to file its answer.
135
The State's reply brief must present all preliminary objections and simultaneously address the merits of the case. 136 Additional briefs may be filed only by special permission. [VOL. 9:639
When written proceedings are completed, the Court will fix a date for oral proceedings. 138 These hearings may include examination of witnesses by the advocates as well as by the judges, and closing arguments from both sides. 139 In addition to receiving evidence provided by the parties, the Court may also act on its own initiative to obtain evidence as it feels is appropriate by establishing evidentiary hearings, requesting a report from a government office or private association, or summoning expert witnesses.
140 Witnesses may give their testimony remotely, in lieu of traveling to Costa Rica. 141 Hearings may be public or private.
142
If the parties decide at a late stage to reach a friendly settlement, it is within the Court's discretion to continue to hear and decide the case, or to strike it from its list.
143
After written and oral proceedings are completed, the Court generally waits until its next general session to convene deliberations. 144 The Court's deliberations are conducted in private. 145 The Court's decision on the preliminary objections and on the merits are typically published in the same opinion, 146 generally issued a short while after deliberations.
147
A decision on reparations is generally postponed to permit parties time to reach a friendly settlement in light of the Court's ruling on the merits.
148
The court may also issue a decision on reparations as part of the original judgment, or at a later date. 149 Generally, the processing of a case from filing to judgment on the merits takes a bit over two years; the reparations phase may take an additional year or year and a half.
150
Any judge may publish a separate concurring or dissenting opinion.
151
In practice, however, dissents are rare. total of nineteen judgments were issued. 152 More than half of these judgments were published with one or more separate opinions; a total of sixteen such opinions across thirteen judgments. 153 Few of these separate opinions, however, are true dissents. Ten are concurrences that merely laid out additional reasoning in support of the Court's holding. 154 Two are dissents on minor issues unrelated to the central holding. 155 In two cases, a single judge wrote separately to recommend a holding even more favorable to the victim than the one adopted by the Court. 156 The three true dissents were each lone votes by ad-hoc judges, written to express an opinion more favorable to the States that had appointed them. The Court's advisory jurisprudence procedures are slightly different. A request for an advisory opinion may be submitted by a Member State, by the Commission, or by other organs of the OAS. 158 Because there is no specific case or controversy, there is no requirement of exhaustion of domestic and Commission procedures.
The procedures for addressing advisory opinions are somewhat less formalized than those governing contentious disputes. 159 Generally, however, the same procedures for written briefs and oral arguments are applied, with modifications as the Court feels appropriate. 160 The Court's advisory jurisprudence proceeds significantly faster than its contentious jurisprudence-requests are typically answered in under a year. 161 In addition to resolving petitions, cases, and requests for advisory opinions, the Commission performs a number of activities not related to the petition system. These include the production of annual and topical reports and on-site fact-finding missions.
These non-juridical functions comprise a historically significant part of the Inter-American Commission's work. Between the signing of the American Convention in 1966 and its entry into force in 1978, these activities formed the whole of the Commission's activities to promote human rights in the hemisphere.
This extra-judicial role for the Commission, comparable to that of an ombudsman or administrative agency, is also a feature of the InterAmerican human rights system that distinguishes it from the European one.
F. Publications
The Commission has its own publications, including the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 162 Occasionally, the Commission also publishes Special Reports on thematic topics and Country Reports examining the situation of human rights in particular Member States. A yearly account of the Court's cases and activities-including summaries of proceedings and the full text of its judgments-is contained in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, published by the Court through the OAS. 164 Annual reports, a list of current cases, past judgments, advisory opinions, provisional measures, press releases, and other publications are available at the website of the Court. 165 All records related to the Court's cases, including parties' briefs, evidentiary documents, and transcripts of public hearings, are also published. These documents are not available online, but can be accessed through the Court's library in Costa Rica in their original languages. 166 The Court's deliberations are recorded, but are not made public.
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G. Jurisprudence
The Court's annual caseload has increased significantly during its existence. 168 In its first three years, 1987-1989, the Court decided only three cases on the merits. 169 In the three years 2006-2008, the Court decided thirty-seven cases. 170 The most frequent violations of human rights addressed by the Court include the right to a fair trial (eighty-one violations declared), the right to humane treatment (sixty-six violations), 164 . Inter-Am. Ct Economic, social, and cultural rights play even less of a role in the Inter-American Court's human rights jurisprudence. Although these rights were explicitly recognized in extensive detail in the American Declaration, 182 they were largely excluded from the 1969 Convention, which listed no specific obligations of States to respect socioeconomic rights. 183 Since its establishment, the Court has never found a State to be in violation of Article 26, the sole provision of the American Convention which references economic, social, and cultural rights. 184 In 1988, the OAS adopted the Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 185 As with the American Convention, however, Member States were relatively slow to ratify, and the Protocol entered into force only in late 1999.
186
The jurisprudential concepts permitting adjudication of socioeconomic rights have only recently become better developed. 187 Since the Court has authority to apply this Protocol to those States that have ratified it, it is possible that socioeconomic rights will come to play a greater role in the Court's future jurisprudence. In this respect, it is notable that in 2009, the Court explicitly asserted its competency to determine violations of Article 26, although concluding that the right was not violated in that case. Despite the hurdles to bringing socioeconomic rights petitions against States that are not parties to the Protocol, the Inter-American system has found other ways to address these rights. 189 The Commission has included economic, social, and cultural rights issues in its Thematic and Country Reports, even where such violations are not admissible through the petition system. 190 The Court has also managed to vindicate socioeconomic rights claims indirectly, where these have been presented in the context of cases relying primarily on civil and political rights, such as the right to nondiscrimination.
191
In large part, the Court devotes its resources to ascertaining the facts of a situation to determine if a human rights violation has taken place. 192 The Court is also very active in issuing binding requests for provisional measures to protect vulnerable persons. 193 In a broader sense, the Court also has an important law-making role as the authoritative interpreting body of the American Convention. The Court's judgments serve to clarify the specific duties of States Parties to the Convention, as well as what practices constitute a violation of its terms. For example, the Court has interpreted Article 1 of the Convention (Obligation to Respect Rights) to impose upon States the four-fold duty to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress violations of the other substantive rights provisions of the Convention. 194 Similarly, the Court has interpreted Article 2 (Domestic Legal Effects) to require States to harmonize their domestic laws with the American Convention.
195
It should be noted that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considers itself as a court of equity, responsible to the principles of human rights that underlie the regional treaties, rather than to strict principles of interpretation based on the intent of the sovereign actors that created them. Because human rights are understood as based in natural law, existing prior to and independent of state recognition, the content of legal duties to respect rights can evolve as international human rights norms are clarified and expanded, subjecting States to increasing obligations without specific authorization.
H. Enforcement
The American Convention and the OAS Charter are vague on the subject of how the Court's judgments should be enforced. The European human rights system invests the Committee of Ministers with the responsibility of ensuring that States comply with the ECHR's rulings. 196 No similar provision exists in the American system. The Convention does, however, direct the Commission and the Court to submit annual reports to the General Assembly of the OAS, 197 which provides some enforcement oversight.
The General Assembly regularly discusses human rights issues at its sessions. 198 Occasionally, it issues resolutions urging action on issues of special concern identified by the Commission and Court. [VOL. 9:639
The General Assembly of the OAS also has the discretionary authority to pass sanctions against States that have not complied with the recommendations of the Commission or orders of the Court. For example, the General Assembly instituted broad-based economic sanctions against Haiti in the 1990s after a military junta took over the government and ousted the elected president. 200 Many observers criticized these sanctions, however, as causing more humanitarian harm than good. 201 The General Assembly has not always been inclined to exercise these enforcement powers. In the 1970s, the Commission took a strong stance against the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime in Argentina. 202 The OAS declined to adopt follow-up measures, prompting several Commission Members to resign in protest. 203 Today, however, substantial normative pressure exists to cooperate with the Commission and the Court, apart from any formal sanctions by the OAS, and States usually comply with orders for reparations.
204
The Court itself has assumed responsibility for monitoring the domestic enforcement of its reparations decisions, a practice which consumes a considerable amount of its attention and resources. 205 The Court's efforts in this regard should be understood as merely a sustained application of the Court's moral force, not as a truly distinct enforcement mechanism.
II. EFFECTIVENESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The effectiveness of an international tribunal may be judged in several aspects, not all of which are easily measured. In simple terms, a court's effectiveness may be measured by the number of cases it resolves, and whether the orders that it issues are in fact followed. Ultimately, however, human rights tribunals exist in large part to achieve much broader effects. Here a system's effectiveness should be judged by its success in encouraging adhesion to human rights norms and influencing the behavior of state political actors in order to prevent violations of rights. A regime's effectiveness along these latter dimensions is somewhat harder to quantify, as well as more difficult to attribute clearly to the influence of any one institution.
A. Evaluating Impact
In terms of the first set of measures-number of cases resolved and state compliance with the indicated resolution-the weaknesses of the under-resourced Commission are apparent. In one recent year, the Commission received 1,330 complaints of human rights violations. 206 It was able to process and resolve only eighty-four. 207 The record of state compliance with Commission recommendations is also uneven. Of roughly ninety cases decided by the Commission between 2002 and 2005, full state compliance has been achieved in only six cases. 208 The majority of cases are characterized by partial or progressive compliance, while in twenty-four cases the State has completely failed to comply with the recommendations of the Commission. 209 This record of uneven compliance constitutes a situation of the glass seen as half-full or half-empty. Since individual petitions necessarily reflect situations where the State had not previously been disposed to resolve the human rights violation internally, each instance of compliance represents some measure of effectiveness of the regional human rights system. The present record, however, clearly leaves much to be desired.
The Court's provisional measures practice also has uneven results. In 2005, the Court observed that in seven cases, state non-compliance with orders for protective measures had already resulted in deaths. 210 Despite these failures, the Inter-American system's relative strength is remarkable given the low level of political will to protect human rights prevailing within the region at the time it was established. In 1969, when the Convention was adopted, more than half of Latin America was ruled by authoritarian regimes. In 1978, when the Court was established, there were still only four democracies in all of Latin America.
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The fact that the Inter-American human rights system was as effective as it was during decades characterized by widespread national disregard for human rights in the region has been described as something of a paradox. 212 Human rights scholar David Forsythe has described the puzzle in these terms:
A functioning regime for the promotion and protection of international human rights exists in the Western hemisphere, despite a milieu of gross violations of those rights. . . . How did it come to be that the OAS operates a regional human rights regime second only to the Council of Europe, but without the same underlying political commitment to implementing rights? 213 Jack Donnelly has suggested that the Inter-American human rights system was able to be so surprisingly effective because of the support and influence exercised by the United States as the hemispheric hegemon. 214 Forsythe, however, convincingly disputes this explanation. 215 He points out that U.S. regional support for human rights has been intermittent and of limited effect, given that many American States react negatively to the assertion of U.S. foreign policy priorities. 216 Thus, although U.S. leadership was occasionally an important factor, it should not be overestimated. 217 Forsythe suggests instead that the Inter-American system's effectiveness at promoting human rights within the region must be attributed in large part to dynamics of moral leadership-influence on state elites to behave in a particular way-which gathers an important part of its effectiveness not from threat of external force but from mutual recognition that it is the right thing to do. 218 According to Forsythe, such moral leadership was sometimes exercised by the United States, and sometimes by a shifting coalition of less powerful States. 219 After the establishment of the Commission and Court, it has also been exercised by the professionals of these institutions.
The last three decades have witnessed a tremendous shift in respect for human rights in the Americas. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Latin American governments -disappeared‖ an estimated 11,000-13,000 individuals.
220 Today, such abuses are almost unthinkable in most of Latin America. A similar shift has been noted in democratization throughout the region.
221 Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink have described the human rights transition experienced in Latin America during this period as a -‗norm cascade'-a rapid shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of human rights norms and international and regional action on behalf of those norms.‖ 222 These observations, however, do not answer the question of how much credit for the shift is due to the activities of the Inter-American system. In 1991, Forsythe characterized the impact of regional human rights mechanisms as -modest.‖ 223 A more favorable assessment may be justified, however, in light of the continued shift to greater democratization and fewer violations of human rights in the region since 1991.
States do not always comply with the recommendations of the Commission and orders of the Court in the specific cases that reach those bodies. Yet the very existence of these mechanisms-the threat that they will intervene, subjecting States to reputational sanctions-undoubtedly has some positive influence on state compliance with human rights norms.
The Inter-American Commission first innovated the strategy of human rights fact-finding and reporting in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, such -name and shame‖ tactics are the backbone of human rights promotion activities by non-governmental human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which did not come into being until the end of the 1970s. The creation of the Inter-American Commission and Court was initially a way for advocates of human rights within the Americas, at different points in history, to advance their human rights goals in the region. These institutions took on a life of their own, however, independent of their initial supporters. Both the Commission and Court have gradually assumed more powers than originally intended and probably expanded the content of rights beyond what their creators had hoped. 224 They have continued to advance the cause of human rights in the Americas even when their original proponents were out of power and those in power did not particularly care about human rights. The Inter-American human rights system thus performed an important function in the region as a sustained source of moral leadership for human rights, even as individual States' commitment to these norms changed with passing regimes and administrations.
It must be noted, however, that the system continues to experience significant limits to its potential effectiveness. The Commission and Court do not have the institutional resources to address the majority of allegations filed. 225 The Inter-American human rights system has also barely begun to address economic, social, and cultural rights in the region. Both failures should be understood as stemming from a lack of political will within the OAS system to strengthen the Inter-American human rights system. Currently, one-third of OAS States are not signatories to the Convention, including both the United States and Canada.
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B. Comparisons
The Inter-American human rights system bears many similarities to the European system that preceded it, yet there are also significant differences.
Most fundamentally, the European system does not have a distinct Commission body. The European Court of Human Rights directly processes all received petitions. 227 In contrast, the African regional human rights system has followed the American model, establishing a Commission charged with promoting human rights in 1987 and adding a Court empowered to hear individual petitions many years later. 228 In addition, the Inter-American system handles significantly fewer cases than its European counterpart. The Commission administers approximately 1,500 individual petitions in a year, approximately one percent of which will eventually go before the Court. 229 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights (-ECHR‖) in Strasbourg deals with approximately 10,000 individual petitions per year. 230 With its forty fulltime judges, the ECHR offers an effective right of appeal to all victims of human rights violations in Europe. 231 The comparatively tiny and underresourced American system must pick and choose the most serious cases, and hope that its rulings have a ripple effect through gradual norm strengthening and imitation by national courts. Although it has frequently been proposed that the OAS transform the part-time Inter-American Court into a permanent body, 232 there appears to be little political will to allocate the necessary resources to this project.
The American system also lacks an independent body charged with overseeing enforcement of the Court's decisions, such as the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 233 Rather, a significant portion of the Court's time is consumed by monitoring compliance with its previous judgments. The Court's reticence to delegate this enforcement responsibility to the general regional governance body may be wellplaced. Two of the OAS' most influential members, the United States and Canada, have never recognized the competency of the Court. 234 The United States, moreover, has historically displayed a willingness to overlook human rights violations of allied nations in the pursuit of regional geopolitical objectives. 235 [VOL. 9:639
These differences must also be understood in light of the InterAmerican human rights system's very different geopolitical context from the European system. The Inter-American human rights system was tasked with enforcing human rights standards in a region where systematic gross violations of human rights by military dictatorships were the norm, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. 236 In contrast, for most of its history the ECHR exercised jurisdiction only over members of the Council of Europe, which required democratic governance and basic respect for human rights as a condition of membership. 237 Thus, while it is generally accepted that the European human rights system is stronger than the American one, the Inter-American system's accomplishments are noteworthy given the circumstances.
Several unique features of the Inter-American system in contrast to the European one reflect this different political context and the corresponding greater need to engage in promotional activities outside the narrow jurisprudential role. The Inter-American system places great emphasis on efforts to reach friendly resolutions through negotiations, which permits the Commission to take on an attitude of constructive engagement with state governments. The practice of site visits by the Commissionfunctioning as something of a national human rights -checkup‖-is also unique to the Inter-American system. The Court's practice of advisory jurisprudence, which emphasizes the pure interpretation of norms as opposed to their concrete application, also has no parallel in the European system. 238 These innovative approaches reflect the needs of a region characterized by widespread human rights violations, where commitment to rule of law and human rights principles has historically been thin. For the Court to be effective, the States within its jurisdiction must have a pre-existing domestic commitment to the judicial and substantive norms of human rights, which is sufficiently strong to influence a State that loses a case to obey the judgment on principle. In contrast, the Commission relies on engagement, voluntary settlement, investigation of complaints, and exposure of offending regimes rather than the informal sanctions of regional opinion. It is thereby able to gain a foothold and have an 236 . NOWAK, supra note 230, at 189-90. 237. Id. As the European Union and the ECHR expand to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the European Court may begin to experience challenges similar to those historically faced by the Inter-American system. 238. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 36, at 45.
influence even in regimes characterized by poor rule of law and internal commitment to human rights. The lessons of Inter-American history suggest that the much younger African regional human rights system may yet come to play a significant role in entrenching human rights norms on the continent. Africa today is characterized by a similar mixture of rights-respecting and rights-abusive regimes as was Latin America at the time its regional human rights system came into being. As in Latin America, the African region began by forming a Commission with a limited mandate in 1986, 239 later adding a Court entitled to hear petitions lodged against consenting States in 2004.
240
It may be hoped that the African continent will see a similar gradual but powerful shift to democracy and compliance with human rights norms over the next decades. In this light, it is encouraging that the African system has managed to progress from the creation of a regional charter of rights to the establishment of a regional court in only seventeen years, a process which took thirty years in the American region.
C. The Problem of Cuba
Although the founders of the Inter-American human rights system intended it to govern the entire Western Hemisphere, several limitations hold it back from being a truly regional system. First, two of the hemisphere's most powerful nations, Canada and the United States, have not ratified the American Convention.
241 Second, the system has had limited success in engaging the Caribbean sub-region. These two factors suggest that the Commission and Court function more as a Latin American human rights system than a truly Inter-American one.
In addition, the system has very limited influence over Cuba, which was long barred from OAS membership. Cuba was among the founding members of the OAS in 1948. 242 In 1962, however, the Castro government was barred from participation in the OAS, following strengthened ties with the Soviet Union. 243 Cuba thus could not legally ratify the Convention or recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, even if it were politically inclined to do so.
The Commission has long maintained, however, that the limitations on Cuba's participation do not exempt the Cuban State from its continued status as an OAS member and therefore the obligation of adherence to regional standards on human rights.
244 Accordingly, the Commission regularly hears petitions and issues reports on the country's human rights situation. The Commission's influence on States comes from the reputational rewards or sanctions that States experience within the OAS system by virtue of their perceived efforts to cooperate with the regional human rights system. Precisely because of Cuba's outcast status in the region, it has little incentive to work with the Commission.
Recently, the situation has shown some hope of changing. In June of 2009, a consensus resolution of the General Assembly indicated a willingness to restore Cuba's full privileges of membership, subject to its willingness to pursue a -human rights dialogue.‖ 245 Cuba has so far indicated little eagerness to accept the invitation. 246 Politically, this decision makes sense for Cuba given the stated conditions. A regional dialogue on the poor state of human rights in Cuba would surely be embarrassing, both domestically and internationally. In return, there is no real guarantee that the process would lead to Cuba's restored OAS privileges without further conditions, which might be unacceptable to Cuban leaders.
Indeed, the United States has suggested that Cuba will not be permitted to resume its place at the OAS until it becomes a democracy. 247 Imposing such high barriers to Cuba's participation may be counterproductive. In principle, an insistence upon democracy prior to membership is defensible. Democratic governance has, albeit only very recently, become the strong norm in the Americas. Excluding the region's only non-democratic government from participation may work an important function of reinforcing this norm. Historically, however, it has never been the policy of the OAS or the Inter-American human rights system to require a democratically elected government as a condition of membership or participation. This raises questions not only about whether it is fair to impose such a standard upon Cuba, but more importantly, whether it is wise. The lessons of the Inter-American human rights system over the past several decades suggest that membership in the OAS, combined with the normative influence of the human rights institutions, has, on the whole, been an impressively effective force for human rights improvements. The Commission in particular has a proven track record of successful diplomacy with rights-violating regimes. There is good reason to expect that over time, engagement with the Inter-American human rights system would work a positive effect on Cuban practices, an achievement that the U.S. strategy of isolation has yet to produce.
Only once Cuba escapes its current pariah status within the OAS, however, would it have something to lose from a failure to engage with the Commission's efforts. Those parties concerned about the state of human rights in Cuba should, therefore, seriously consider supporting the readmission of Cuba to the OAS without preconditions.
A more demanding approach would be to restore Cuba's OAS privileges, provided that it ratifies the Convention, recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court, and remains in compliance with any judgments. Obviously, the United States is in somewhat of an awkward position to urge this approach, since it has not satisfied these conditions. Other countries could take the lead in negotiating this diplomatic compromise if the United States does not oppose it. The condition to remain in compliance with judgments of the Court would certainly also represent a major hurdle of political will to Cuba as well.
A middle-ground approach, however, might offer the right mix of incentives, requiring Cuba to ratify the Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador but not to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. In this Cuba rejoins the inter-American system. Until then, we will seek new ways to engage Cuba that benefit the people of both nations and the hemisphere.‖).
limited-conditions approach, the Commission would gain the moral advantage of Cuba's having recognized regional human rights in principle. Yet Cuba would retain the sovereignty to adjudicate these rights internally, making the compromise seem a smaller sacrifice. Indeed, the ability to claim some element of moral superiority to the United States in having ratified two human rights treaties that the United States has not, might operate as an additional incentive for Cuba to accept.
Both the no-conditions and the limited-conditions approaches rely on a conviction that, over time, the soft-power mechanisms of Commission engagement and regional pressure will promote substantial human rights improvements. With either of these approaches, the Commission would likely benefit from additional resources-already inadequate to the taskas it moves to expand its efforts to promote human rights in Cuba. Although the United States and Canada are not parties to the Convention, they might be able to support the provision of these resources.
D. The Cultural Divide
Cuba and the United States are not the only nations in the hemisphere that are effectively outside of the Inter-American human rights system. Notably, all of the Spanish-and Portuguese-speaking nations within the region (with the exception of Cuba) have acceded to the jurisdiction of the Court, yet most of the English-speaking nations have not. 248 What explains this Anglo-American trend of non-participation?
One reason that Canada and the United States might choose not to participate in international human rights regimes is to protect the privileges of states within a federal system. The federal republics of Mexico and Brazil, however, have both managed to ratify the Convention. 249 Moreover, the many English-speaking island States that are not parties can hardly claim a federalism excuse.
A better explanation may lie in the fact that the English-speaking countries of the hemisphere have long enjoyed effective systems of appellate courts in stable democratic regimes, and therefore did not perceive a need to join the Inter-American one. The United States was one of the first nations in the world to develop domestic constitutional adjudication protecting the civil and political rights recognized in the 248. English-speaking countries which have acceded to jurisdiction are: Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. Barbados issued a provisional order to stay an execution in 2004. Dominica issued new reservations in 1998, revoking its recognition of the jurisdiction of the court.
249. Organization of American States, supra note 23.
Convention. For decades, the English-speaking Caribbean countries and Canada were governed by the British Commonwealth appellate system. Long-established and well-financed, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council provides a more effective institutional structure for human rights review than the Inter-American system could fairly claim. Canada opted out of the Commonwealth system in 1982, replacing it with a national constitution and a constitutional court empowered to adjudicate individual rights.
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More recently, Caribbean nations have expressed increasing discontent with British judicial rule, particularly in the area of death penalty jurisprudence. 251 Caribbean nations have also increasingly chafed at membership in the Inter-American system, which still issues many of its decisions only in Spanish. The Inter-American system's opposition to the death penalty, however, has particularly motivated the push by some English-speaking islands to create a substitute human rights body. 252 As a result, the Caribbean Court of Justice came into being in 2005 and has issued approximately sixty judgments to date. 253 Culturally, linguistically, and jurisprudentially, there are good arguments for the -Inter-American‖ human rights system to concede the issue and embrace its true role as the Latin-American regional human rights system. Canada and the United States have little need for international oversight, and the Caribbean nations have decisively expressed their preference for their own, English-language system. Such fragmentation is problematic, however, to the extent that the InterAmerican system relies on the OAS for its enforcement since many members of the OAS are already committed to not participating in that system.
CONCLUSIONS
As the Inter-American human rights system enters its fifth decade of operation, there are many achievements to celebrate. The Commission and Court have played an important role in the region's democratic transition and today constitute the world's second-strongest international human rights regime. The innovative investigative and promotional activities of the Commission have also served as a model for non-governmental human rights organizations and the African human rights system. Yet many challenges remain. The institutions require a greater investment of resources to effectively process the many petitions they receive. Also, the system still lacks comparably effective promotion of socioeconomic rights. Moreover, enforcement of the system's recommendations and orders remains a challenge with no easy solution in a regional political system with inconsistent commitment to human rights.
